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Introduction 
For the past fifty years South Korea and the United States have successfully contained the threat of a 
North Korean invasion with the resulting peace contributing to the security of both nations and the Asian 
Pacific region as a whole. Yet security concerns in the Northeast Asian and Pacific region have changed 
significantly since the early 1950s when the Korean-U.S. alliance was formed. The Cold War has ended, 
and the improvement of U.S.-China relations has changed the security climate around the Korean 
peninsula. These changes in the regional security environment dictate the need to find a potentially new 
model for the South Korea-U.S. alliance.  
The fact that a military threat from the North Koreans remains emphasizes the necessity of a continuing 
alliance. Furthermore, other U.S. and ROK interests are also at stake—the United States has continued 
its forward presence in the Korean peninsula, which, in conjunction with the bases in Japan, has served 
to achieve U.S. strategic goals in the Asia-Pacific region; Korea and the United States, through the 
alliance, have increased interoperability of weapons systems and conducted many joint military exercises; 
and the United States has strived to further its interests in the political and economic areas through the 
maintenance of a close relationship with Korea based on the military alliance. 
However, considering the economic gap between the two Koreas and the change in the overall security 
environment, we can assume that the current status will not continue forever. Therefore, it seems 
worthwhile to consider the optimal model of an alliance as the peninsula moves towards unification, as 
well as once the North Korean threat has been neutralized.  
In researching the two nations' military security alliance, the following approaches should be taken. First, 
identifying the mid- to long-term security benefits for the two nations and analyzing any common and 
competing interests. Second, creating feasible alternatives to the current alliance model that can achieve 
common security interests. Third, applying a set of standards to these alternatives and evaluating them to 
identify the optimal relationship. This essay will pursue these approaches. 
The Mid and Long-term Security Concerns for South Korea and the United States 
An alliance is a collection of mutually related policies of understanding and agreement. There exists a 
common strategic concept and goals, and in order to achieve those goals, a system of shared 
responsibility reflecting a common defensive strategy. Many negotiations and agreements take place to 
determine how responsibility is shared, on topics ranging from the scale and type of the military force to 
how the costs for maintaining deployed forces are split. An essential point in these negotiations lies in 
figuring out the nations' common security interests. 
A survey of the United States' and South Korea's mid- to long-term security interests on the Korean 
peninsula yields the following. 
I. South Korean Interests 
(1) Major Interests 
A. Discouraging the North Korean threat 
B. Discouraging North Korea's nuclear program 
C. Achievement of peaceful unification 
D. Preventing the emergence of a regional superpower 
(2) Important Interests 
A. Attaining sufficient national self-defense capabilities 
B. Preventing regional crises 
C. Achieving weapons system compatibility with allies 
D. Protection of sea lanes and overseas assets 
E. Maintaining a competitive defense industry 
II. United States' Interests 
(1) Major Interests 
A. Discouraging the North Korean threat 
B. Discouraging North Korea's nuclear program 
C. Maintaining influence within the Asian Pacific region 
D. Preventing the emergence of a regional superpower 
E. Maintaining economic ties and creating markets in the Asian Pacific region. 
(2) Important Interests 
A. Spreading democracy and free market economics 
B. Preventing regional crises and the emergence of possible enemy states 
C. Attaining allied weapon sales market 
D. Protection of sea lanes and overseas assets 
E. Defense budget savings through contributions by allied nations 
Classifying the two nations' security interests can by quite subjective. However, if we accept the above 
classification, we see that there are many common interests and next to no areas of conflict.  
More important, the United States and South Korea share many security interests even after the North 
Korean military threat is nullified. For example, neither a unified Korea nor the United States would want 
an unduly large defense budget, and both sides would continue to desire safe shipping lanes. Therefore 
there is merit in continuing some sort of an alliance.  
Forecasting the Security Environment of the Korean Peninsula 
Over the past half century the North's baiting and brinksmanship has continued largely unabated and, 
despite its economic crisis, the North continues to increase its strategic military might. Thus, for the South 
and the United States, the military threat has not been reduced nor gone away. 
But in the near future the security environment in the Korean peninsula will change significantly. First, the 
North cannot afford to keep competing militarily given its economic crisis. Second, growing concern 
among Southeast Asian states for their own security interests will encourage those states to steer North 
Korea toward societal reform and a revitalization of its economy in the interest of regional stability. As 
time progresses we can expect three different stages of relations between the two Koreas. 
Maintaining the status quo: Here, North Korea continues to maintain anti-South forces and deploys them 
forward; no talks or cooperation between the two Koreas are taking place at the government level; and 
North Korea continues its development of weapons of mass destruction. 
Movement towards unification: Efforts are made towards building trust between the two Koreas with 
visible cooperation taking place in the form of trade, communication and investment; and talks are 
pursued in order to reduce military spending. 
Post unification: If unification takes place, the United States and Korea will shift their focus toward trying 
to prevent a regional powerhouse from emerging, and maintaining security in the region. Therefore the 
alliance will change significantly. 
These three stages are very conceptual. In them we do not consider how they will come about, say 
through the implosion of the North Korean government, or through peaceful talks. Also we did not 
consider how neighboring states would react to this fundamental change in the security around the 
Korean peninsula. 
The New Korea-U.S. Alliance Model 
Now we shall try to picture four security environments, equally applicable to pre-and post-unification 
Korea, that can be expected around the peninsula. We assume that the United States and Korea will 
judge it necessary to continue pursuing their shared security interests even after the peninsula's 
unification, but the form this pursuit takes can vary widely depending on the overall security situation. In 
describing these possible environments, we look for each alternative's main emphasis, effect on security, 
and each nation's responsibilities.  
Model 1: Strong alliance 
This model is identical to the current alliance, where the two nations jointly face military threat, basically to 
deter and, if needed, to fight. In order to fight such a strong external threat, the allies require a singular 
chain of command and periodic joint exercises.  
Such an alliance requires adequate sharing of roles including having Korea focus on initial levels of 
warfare up until the arrival of reinforcements from the United States. In the case of an emergency, 
reinforcements will mostly consist of navy and air force, and Korea will support them as the host nation. 
To maximize Korean defenses, the USFK must maintain early warning and intelligence capabilities. Even 
after unification, though the military threat may decrease, the roles will not change significantly to counter 
large threats to Korean security. Under this model, the United States will continue to have a troop 
presence on the Korean peninsula. The scale of the forces will largely depend on the external threat and 
other factors, but we can expect some land forces as well as air force deployment in the Korean 
peninsula. 
This model currently is a must given the current North Korean threat. However, once the North Korean 
threat goes away, or when unification takes place, it does not automatically mean the nullification of this 
alliance. a unified Korea still would face China, Russia and Japan across its borders and likely could not 
guarantee its safety on its own. While Korea could develop an alliance with one of those three nations to 
cope with the other two, this is unlikely given the historic ties between Korea and the United States and 
the United States' interest in maintaining its military in a unified Korea to help its role in the Asian Pacific 
region. 
Model 2: Relaxed Security Alliance centered on Korea. 
Under this model, Korea will be responsible for a greater portion of its own defense. Most land, air and 
sea forces will be Korea's responsibility while the United States will offer crisis reinforcements to aid a 
Korea-centered defense. The strategic concept of the two forces will mostly center on crisis management. 
Since the United States' role will diminish the forces deployed will decrease as well with the remaining 
forces mostly responsible for maintaining the infrastructure for the reinforcements. 
In Model 2, Korea has more responsibility in the strategy, command, and force structure of national 
defense compared to Model 1. Korea will react to most outside threats on its own, relying on the United 
States only when self-defense is impossible. Thus, the United States will be a major security partner but 
will exist as an outside force, and the provision of a nuclear umbrella will continue. Under this model, 
USFK will exist not to aid Korea's self defense but to prepare for the instability of the region, a concept 
closer to forward deployment. Under this model, reinforcements from the mainland can be sent as well. 
In this model, the United States will maintain various communication and intelligence assets and 
capabilities to accept and support reinforcements. The concept of POMCUS, which is placing U.S. 
equipment prior to a crisis, continued periodical joint exercises, and a small-scale force would all be 
maintained. U.S. forces would periodically visit Korea for exercises but, again, Model 2 assumes a 
significantly smaller force. 
Model 1 assumed a strong North Korean threat, and Model 2 assumes that there is less threat. This 
model assumes that even after the North Korean threat is gone, uncertainty in the security environment 
will persist in the region and thus a USFK presence is needed. 
Model 3: Regional Security Alliance 
The elimination of the North Korean military threat in the Korean peninsula or the unification of the two 
Koreas will cause significant changes in the security environment of the Asian Pacific region, as well as 
the U.S.-Korean alliance that was formed fifty years ago, greatly changing the need for U.S. troops in 
Korea. If the North Korean threat is eliminated, the focus of the two nations may shift towards regional 
security, including the uncertain security situation in Northeast and Asian Pacific region, and the 
protection of sea-lanes. 
Today, where the North Korean threat is present, the United States and South Korea have maintained 
early surveillance and readiness for war. This limits the military flexibility of both nations. This model 
assumes the elimination of such an omnipresent threat thus making more flexible alternatives possible. 
Compare this situation to that of NATO's Operation Allied Forces in the former Yugoslavia, where much of 
the USAF was sent but not deployed permanently. Under this model of continued alliance for regional 
security reasons, there are three different models of alliance depending on what strategic and tactical 
goals are pursued. 
A. A regional alliance centered in the U.S. homeland: U.S. troops will mostly be stationed in the United 
States with foreign-based forces having special missions. The force deployed in the Korean peninsula 
would be symbolic. Such an alliance will require close cooperation with a regional security partner such 
as Korea or Japan and the United States will focus more on power projection or sending emergency 
reinforcements upon times of crisis. 
B. Spread regional alliances: The two nations will maintain an alliance for regional security, and USFK will 
remain and cooperate closely with other U.S. forces that are deployed in the area. Here the 'spread' 
concept means that the United States will spread its forces roughly evenly to allied nations around the 
world. As before, the forces needed for homeland defense and worldwide reinforcement will remain in the 
U.S. homeland while forces required for regional security will be forward deployed in allied nations to 
prevent redundancy in investment. 
C. Alliance centered in the Korean peninsula: The United States will continue keeping a major force in 
Korea for regional stability and will try to respond to any crisis in the region with the forces stationed in 
Korea. This model will have a larger U.S. presence in Korea than 'a' and 'b' above. 
In any of these regional alliance models, Korea will support needed bases and logistics, commence joint 
military exercises and actively participate in regional multinational excursions with the United States. If the 
North Korean threat is eliminated, these exercises will serve to keep peace or to prepare for crises. For 
the United States, the Korean force will be part of the allied force that can be counted upon in a regional 
crisis. In order to prepare for such a multilateral force the United States will maintain interoperability and 
exercises in order to establish a singular chain of command. 
Model 4: Political Alliance 
This model assumes that Korea does not feel any sort of threat to its security. Without an external threat, 
no military alliance is maintained but political ties remain. This situation is similar to that of NATO prior to 
1949 when a centralized chain of command was formed. The two nations will continue high level talks 
regarding security exchange and cooperation but no large-scale military exercise will take place. In any 
crisis Korea will respond on its own. When needed the United States may enter the conflict, but no 
expectations are placed. 
In this model, the United States will send aid or participate in Korea's defense due to its political affinity, 
and no peacetime exercises are commenced. Therefore Korea sees the United States as being over the 
horizon. In this model, no combat force is stationed in Korea save for a small contingency of liaison 
officers and perhaps symbolic air and navy units. 
Standards of Comparison when Choosing a Model of Alliance 
Deciding on an alliance model requires a standard of comparison between models. I suggest focusing on 
three key points: 
A. Suitability: Which model most suits the national and security interests of the allies at a given time or in 
a given security scenario? Which model works best for deterring a North Korean invasion, preventing a 
regional superpower from emerging post-unification, preventing nuclear arms in the Korean peninsula, 
and balanced sharing of the alliances defense budget?  
B. Feasibility: Can the two nations afford the political and economic costs of an alliance, and maintain it 
while considering other states in the region? Factors to be considered here will be Korea's independence, 
sovereignty, balanced steering of the alliance, reduced costs, national support for the alliance and 
keeping negative responses from the neighboring states to a minimum. 
C. Flexibility: What kind of an alliance can best deal with unforeseen events such as the collapse of the 
North Korean government from within, to the development of nuclear arms by North Korea, the 
emergence of a state more dangerous than North Korea, entreaties to regional cooperation, and 
unpredictable actions taken by China and Russia? 
Evaluating the models on the criteria outlined, or any criteria for that matter, can be a very subjective task. 
Therefore, it would be more appropriate to create a team of experts in politics, diplomacy and security to 
evaluate these, and judge accordingly in order to go beyond subjective reasoning.  
Using these criteria, I believe the following to be an acceptable view of how the U.S. - South Korea 
alliance may adjust over time. 
Category Maintaining Status Quo Cooperation between the two Post-unification 
Koreas, moving toward 
unification 
Phase 1 
Strong alliance for the security 
of the Korean peninsula  
(Model 1) 
Strong alliance for the security of the 
Korean peninsula 
(Model 1) 
Relaxed security alliance 
centered on Korea 
(Model 2) 
Phase 2 
Strong alliance for the security 
of the Korean peninsula  
(Model 1) 







Strong alliance for the security 
of the Korean peninsula  
(Model 1) 







Strong alliance for the security 
of the Korean peninsula  
(Model 1) 




As long as the North Korean threat remains as is, it makes no sense to alter the U.S.-ROK alliance. The 
need for a strong deterrent, both in terms of conventional forces and the nuclear umbrella, remains crucial. 
Clearly this model is suitable and feasible for the situation, and we have 50 years of history to prove it. 
As the two Koreas move towards unification, however, the alliance would shift. At first the U.S. presence 
would remain as is, but as talks progressed and relations become normalized the United States could 
begin to lessen its presence on the peninsula and South Korea could begin to take on a greater portion of 
its own defense. Such a move would demonstrate goodwill towards reconciliation efforts by North Korea. 
As unification draws near, the ROK-U.S. alliance could shift further still, acknowledging the normalization 
of relations and allowing the United States to focus on regional concerns. By not jumping immediately to a 
regional security model, thereby removing a significant U.S. troop presence, the alliance retains flexibility 
in responding or reacting to any breakdowns in negotiations. It also acknowledges that moves toward 
unification could have 'ripple effects' on the Southeast Asian security environment, and allows the United 
States and South Korea to maintain adequate resources to aid in regional security matters.  
The timetable for these shifts, and the specific inter-Korea interactions they would be bound to, is tricky to 
determine—one need only look at the steps and missteps toward the Agreed Framework in the 1990s to 
understand how difficult these negotiations will be. But there is no doubt that movement towards 
unification will necessitate a change in force projection on the peninsula and indeed in the very nature of 
the U.S.-Korea(s) alliance. 
Finally, assuming a smooth transition to a unified Korea, the alliance will be irrevocably changed—the 
threat requiring a strong U.S.-Korea alliance will be removed, and tensions within the region will trump 
tensions on the peninsula as the focus of all concerned. However, the U.S-Korea alliance will be able to 
proceed immediately to a political alliance. Three factors will dictate the speed at which the alliance can 
move towards a regional security model and eventually to a political alliance: the economic hardships 
created in the North over the past half-century and the necessary strains of uniting two long-separated 
nations; the regional stability and security environment; and Korean relations with the other regional 
powers—namely China and Russia. 
Again exact timetables are difficult to ascertain, but it seems appropriate to assume that the alliance 
would move from a relaxed model to a regional model once the peninsula is free from significant threats 
to its security and unified Korea is fully integrated economically and militarily to be able to provide for its 
own defense. The move to a political alliance would be driven more by external factors, and therefore 
may take more time to achieve. 
Conclusion 
South Korea managed to defeat the North Korean invasion thanks to international support with the United 
States at the fore. This support took the ROK's security and military might and used it as the foundation 
upon which the Korean people obtained political freedom and economic prosperity. After the Korean War, 
the two nations have formed an alliance and with it deterred North Korean invasion for the past half-
century, all the while preparing to win a war if deterrence failed. However, recent decades have brought 
an end to the Cold War and changes to the Korean peninsula's security environment. Therefore, this is 
the time when we must begin seeking possibilities for a new model. 
This essay has classified the future environment of the Korean peninsula into three stages, suggested 
four possible alliance models the United States and Korea can opt for, and evaluated them with three 
standards depending on specific situations. We believe that there is a need for interested pupils of 
strategic administration to take this approach and try coming up with a more specific evaluation of policies. 
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